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ABSTRACT
Automatic detection of fake news — texts that are deceitful and misleading — is a long
outstanding and largely unsolved problem. Worse yet, recent developments in language
modeling allow for the automatic generation of such texts. One approach that has recently
gained attention detects these fake news using stylometry-based provenance, i.e. tracing
a text’s writing style back to its producing source and determining whether the source is
malicious. This was shown to be highly effective under the assumption that legitimate text
is produced by humans, and fake text is produced by a language model.
In this work, we identify a fundamental problem with provenance-based approaches against
attackers that auto-generate fake news: fake and legitimate texts can originate from nearly
identical sources. First, a legitimate text might be auto-generated in a similar process
to that of fake text, and second, attackers can automatically corrupt articles originating
from legitimate human sources. We demonstrate these issues by simulating attacks in such
settings, and find that the provenance approach fails to defend against them. Our findings
highlight the importance of assessing the veracity of the text rather than solely relying on its
style or source. We also open up a discussion on the types of benchmarks that should be
used to evaluate neural fake news detectors.
1 Introduction
As the performance of language models improves and generated text becomes more realistic, we face rising
concerns about the malicious use of these models (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Radford et al., 2019). An example of
such misuse is neural fake news (Zellers et al., 2019), automatically generating fake articles en masse.1
One approach for automating fake news detection is fact-checking. These detectors are motivated by the way
humans validate news reports (Nyhan, Reifler, 2015) and focus on identifying falsified information. However,
despite a large body of work in this area, existing detectors are not yet sufficiently accurate to automate the
detection task (Thorne, Vlachos, 2018; Thorne et al., 2018).
Recently, Zellers et al. (2019) proposed an alternative approach, that relies on text provenance, or source
identification. This approach assumes that fake-ness is determined by the source that generated the text.
For instance, we might assume that The Associated Press news articles are more accurate than posts from a
propaganda website (Baly et al., 2018). Alternatively, the source may reflect whether the article was written
by a human or generated by a machine (Hashimoto et al., 2019; Gehrmann et al., 2019; Bakhtin et al., 2019).
In Zellers et al. (2019)’s setup, the language model itself is used to extract language distributional features
from the article that can be traced to a particular text source. These features might implicitly include n-gram
frequencies, sentence structures, coherency of text, among others (Pérez-Rosas et al., 2018).
1https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/14/elon-musk-backed-ai-writes-convincing-news-fiction
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Figure 1: Hypothetical abstraction of the language distributional feature space.
In this paper, we argue that this approach does not fully solve the detection of fake news created by neural
language models. Specifically, it fails in two important instances:
1. Discriminating between truthful and fake information that are both machine-generated. Neural
language models are increasingly used to produce any text. Applications such as auto-completion,
text modification, question answering, text simplification, summarization, and others, are growing in
popularity. Those might be used both for producing legitimate2 (Logan et al., 2019) and malicious
text, resulting in “fake” and “real” text sources that are almost identical.3 To illustrate this problem,
we consider machine-generated text that is true or false in the context of a given article.
2. Detecting an attacker that uses text from a legitimate human source, but automatically corrupts it to
alter its meaning by making only subtle, relatively small changes. Unfortunately, powerful language
models designed for text generation, can also easily be used to corrupt existing text. To demonstrate
this, we consider an attacker that inverts the negation of statements in a human-written article, guided
by a language model’s output probabilities on the attacker’s modification.
The failure of the provenance-based approach is not surprising since both cases are similar in the distributional
features that it relies on. In the first case, both real and fake texts are of an artificial source, as they were
directly generated by a language model. In the second, both real and fake texts originate from a human author
(though the attacker locally and subtly modifies text by an automated procedure). Figure 1 illustrates this.
Our work highlights the need to consider a much broader landscape of how fake news is generated, when
designing automatic detectors. There are many different ways in which machines and humans can collaborate
for writing true and false text pieces. Therefore, we recommend an approach that defines fake news based
on text truthfulness rather than provenance. Under this approach, detector benchmarks would incorporates
truthfulness as a primary indicator for fake-ness.
2 Background
Fact Verification The task of fact-checking is tightly tied to the task of detecting fake (and false) news (Vla-
chos, Riedel, 2014; Wang, 2017). Fact-checking involves retrieving a potential evidence for a claim and
evaluating the stance between them (Popat et al., 2017; Hanselowski et al., 2018; Thorne et al., 2018; Mo-
htarami et al., 2018; Ma et al., 2019).
A fact-checking system could be applied for false news detection by validating each of the article’s claims
against a reliable source. However, the performance of current automatic models is still relatively low (Thorne,
Vlachos, 2018; Schuster et al., 2019).
Machine-generated Text Detection The recent improvement in the quality of text generated by language
models (LM) motivated several studies to examine their differences from human-written text. Hashimoto
et al. (2019) combine the output’s likelihood with human scores to improve the evaluation of the generations.
Gehrmann et al. (2019) visualize the per-token probability to demonstrate that human texts contain less
probable tokens, making them distinguishable from LM’s outputs. Bakhtin et al. (2019) learn a dedicated
provenance neural classifier. While their classifier achieves high in-domain accuracy, they find that it overfits
2http://entm.ag/kpu
3https://www.wired.com/story/how-bots-ruined-clicktivism
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the generated text distribution rather than detecting outliers from human texts, resulting in increased “human-
ness” scores for random perturbations. This finding suggests that, given enough text from multiple sources,
one can train an accurate provenance classifier.
Building on the above observation, Zellers et al. (2019) focus on fake news and create a model dubbed Grover.
Grover can both generate news articles and detect auto-generated news based on provenance. We provide
more details about their model below. In Section 3, we describe our adversarial setting in which fake news
could be similar in distribution to real news, resulting in the failure of such classifiers, even when fine-tuned
on relevant training data.
Grover’s Architecture Grover’s news generator is a Transformer-based LM (Vaswani et al., 2017). Though
architecturally similar to GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019), the generator was trained specifically on news article
texts, conditioned on the article meta-data, and its output tokens are sampled using nucleus sampling (Holtzman
et al., 2019). The generator is trained with a LM objective on a large news corpus from Common Crawl dumps.
The fake news detector is a simple linear classifier on top of the last hidden state of Grover’s LM on the
examined article. The LM parameters are initialized with the pre-trained generator values, from an earlier
checkpoint, and are optimized jointly with the linear layer on the classification training set. To construct this
dataset, fake news were generated by the pretrained generator and real news were sampled human-written
articles.
3 Adversarial Setting
We adopt an adversarial setting similar to that of Zellers et al. (2019). Our attacker wishes to generate
fake text, that contains unverified or false claims, en masse, using a language model to automate the process.
The attacker’s goal is to produce text that fools the verifier. Our verifier is adaptive: it receives a limited set
of examples generated by the attacker, and trains a discriminator to detect the attacker’s texts from legitimately-
produced, real text, containing exclusively human-verified claims (news articles from relatively reputable
sources, like the The New York Times are assumed to be real). We also experiment with a non-adaptive,
zero-shot setting, where the verifier does not receive the attacker’s examples.
Notably, our attackers focus on automatically creating text with false information. We thus adopt the Council
of Europe’s view that fake news are purposefully or mistakenly fallacious news, as factual incorrectness is
the one inherent difference between real and fake news (Wardle, Derakhshan, 2017). This veracity-focused
approach was also used by Pérez-Rosas et al. (2018), though they perform the fake modifications manually.
Conversely, the attackers in Zellers et al. (2019) focus on generating “viral and persuasive” content, considered
as fake news irrespective of its correctness. The two views are complementary, but as our experiments indicate,
truthfulness can be particularly subtle and challenging to detect using language-distributional features.
Our two veracity-based experiments are detailed in Section 4. These attackers are built to exhibit minimal
distributional differences from a real news source, but intentionally include false or tampered statements.
To assess the capacity of our detector, in Section 5 we show that the same defense performs well even on
challenging provenance-based tasks.
Experimental Setup In each experiment, we collected a dataset with a “real” text class and a “fake” text
class and used separate samples for testing and for fine-tuning. We used a Grover-Mega discriminator for all
of the experiments. The weights of the Grover-Mega generator (used by the discriminator) were initialized
from a checkpoint provided by Zellers et al. (2019) and fine-tuned for 10 epochs with our training samples.
For evaluating the zero-shot setting defense, we applied a pretrained Grover-Mega discriminator by querying
its Web interface.
4 Distributional Features Don’t Distinguish Similar Sources
(1) Automatic False vs. True Question Answering
In our first experiment, we simulate a scenario where both the real and the fake texts are machine-generated.
Specifically, an auto-completion text generator is used to extend a news article. A responsible user of
this generator verifies the correctness of the output, whereas an attacker uses the same tool, but verifies
incorrectness.
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SEOUL, South Korea  — North Korea’s leader, Kim   said 
on Sunday that his country was making final preparations 
to conduct its first test of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile  — a bold statement less than a month before 
the inauguration of   Donald J. Trump.  Although North 
Korea has conducted five nuclear tests in the last decade 
and more than 20 ballistic missile tests in 2016 alone, and 
although it habitually threatens to attack the United 
States with nuclear weapons, the country has never   an 
intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. <...>  In his 
speech, Mr.  Kim did not comment on Mr.  Trump’s 
election.  Doubt still runs deep that North Korea has 
mastered all the technology needed to build a reliable 
ICBM.  But analysts in the region said the North’s 
launchings of   rockets to put satellites into orbit in recent 
years showed that the country had cleared some key 
technological hurdles.  After the North’s satellite launch 
in February, South Korean defense officials said the Unha
rocket used in the launch, if successfully reconfigured as a 
missile, could fly more than 7, 400 miles with a warhead 
of 1, 100 to 1, 300 pounds  — far enough to reach most 
of the United States.  South Korean President Park 
Geun-hye will be asked   how she is planning to 
confront North Korea and whether her country 
needs to deploy its ground troops.  It also is unlikely 
that she will deploy U.S. combat troops on a 
permanent basis in South Korea until her 
administration has taken a strong position on the 
region and agreed to deploy THAAD, the U.S. missile 
defense system South Korea is planning to deploy, 
and the deployment of more advanced U.S. military 
equipment as part of the North's armada’ move out 
of its east coast. Mr. Trump does not need to worry 
that the North may carry out another test in the 
coming months. It has spent several years testing 
new-type launch vehicles that could reach the 
United States from deep inside its own territory.
Title: Colombian military: Key rebel and drug trafficker 
killed
A key rebel commander and fugitive from a U.S. drug 
trafficking indictment was killed over the weekend in an 
air attack on a guerrilla encampment, the Colombian 
military said Monday.
Tomas Medina Caracas, known popularly as "El Negro 
Acacio," was a member of the high command of the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and, 
according to Colombian and U.S. officials, helped manage 
the group's extensive cocaine trafficking network. He had 
been in the cross-hairs of the U.S. Justice Department 
since 2002. He was charged with conspiracy to import 
cocaine into the United States and manufacturing and 
distributing cocaine within Colombia to fund the FARC's 
42-year insurgency against the government. U.S. officials 
alleged Medina Caracas managed the rebel group's sales 
of cocaine to international drug traffickers, who in turn 
smuggled it into the United States. He was also indicted 
in the United States along with two other FARC 
commanders in November 2002 on charges of conspiring 
to kidnap two U.S. oil workers from neighboring 
Venezuela in 1997 and holding one of them for nine 
months until a $1 million ransom was paid. Officials said 
the army's Rapid Response Force, backed by elements of 
the Colombian Air Force, tracked Medina Caracas down at 
a FARC camp in the jungle in the south of the country.
We attempt to answer: Who killed Tomas Medina 
Caracas? 
Answer: U.S. Justice Department    (false; Colombian 
military)
We attempt to answer: Who helped manage cocaine 
network?
Answer: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (or FARC) (true)
Title: Nominee Betsy DeVos’s Knowledge of Education Basics 
Is Open to Criticism
Until Tuesday, the fight over Betsy DeVos’s nomination to be 
secretary of education revolved mostly around her support 
of contentious school choice programs. But her confirmation 
hearing that night opened her up to new criticism: <…> Ms. 
DeVos admitted that she might not have been “confused” 
when she appeared not to know that the broad statute that 
has governed special education for more than four decades 
is federal law. <…> She appeared blank on basic education 
terms. Asked how school performance should be assessed, 
she did not know the difference between growth, which 
measures how much students have learned over a given 
period, and proficiency, which measures how many students 
reach a targeted score. Ms. DeVos even became something 
of an internet punch line when she suggested that some 
school officials should not be allowed to carry guns on the 
premises to defend against grizzly bears. <…> But her 
statements on special education could make her vulnerable 
families of children with special needs are a vocal lobby, one 
that Republicans do not want to alienate. <…> Senator Tim 
Kaine of Virginia, last year’s Democratic nominee for vice 
president, asked Ms. DeVos whether schools that receive tax 
dollars should be required to meet the requirements of 
IDEA. “I think that is a matter that’s best left to the states,” 
Ms. DeVos replied. Mr. Kaine came back: “So some states 
might be good to kids with disabilities, and other states 
might not be so good, and then what? People can just move 
around the country if they don’t like how their kids are being 
treated?” Ms. DeVos repeated, “I think that is an issue that’s 
best left to the states. ” “It’s not federal law,” an 
exasperated Mr. Kaine replied. <…> “Do you think families 
should have recourse in the courts if schools don’t meet 
their needs?” she asked. “Senator, I assure you that if 
confirmed I will be very sensitive to the needs of special 
needs students,” Ms. DeVos said. “It’s not about sensitivity, 
although that helps,” Ms. Hassan countered. <…>
(c) Article extension(b) Article modification(a) News question answering
Figure 2: Examples of the “fake news” in our experiments. (a) In the news question answering (Section 4), a
CNN article is presented with two examples of questions (bold) from newsQA (Trischler et al., 2017) and
Grover’s generated answer (red). The first answer is verified by a human annotator to be false and the second
as true. (b) In article modification (m = 6) (Section 4), the negations are marked with a cross-line for deletions
and underline for addition. (c) In the article extension case (Section 5), the bold red text is the generation of
GPT-2 medium to extend the human-written prefix.
In order to create such data, we use the newsQA dataset (Trischler et al., 2017) that contains CNN articles
with questions about them. In this case, the extension (the answer to the question) could be easily validated.
Lastly, to resemble an article extension task, we remove the sentence containing the answer from the article.4
This question-answering application of language models was previously explored by Radford et al. (2019) and
was recently used to automatically generate answers to medical questions.5
Following the setting of Radford et al. (2019), we insert the question into a template that is appended to the
end of the article:
We attempt to answer: <question>
Answer:
Then, the first sentence produced by Grover’s generator is used as a potential answer. We chose this template
by examining common formats of questions in news articles and find it to produce mostly reasonable answers
by Grover’s generator.6 For example, for an article about a man caught with a gun in Washington, and the
question “Where was the suspect stopped?”, Grover generated the answer “2 blocks from the U.S. Capitol.”
See Figure 2 for more examples.
Finally, we manually assess the generated answers. We filter out nonsensical generations (29%) and label the
rest as true or false by the article and external knowledge. Answers containing at least one false statement
4Post the generation, we remove the article’s sentence with the highest word count tf-idf similarity with the question
and answer (concatenated).
5https://github.com/re-search/DocProduct
6Evaluating against the dataset’s ground-truth answers, Grover achieved token-level overlap F1 score of 0.19 on
newsQA’s test set and of 0.25 on our filtered evaluation set.
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Telling fake from real (veracity-based) precision recall F1 accuracy
adaptive
QA (false vs. true) 0.72 0.71 0.71 71%
article modification (m = 2) 0.53 0.52 0.53 53%
article modification (m = 6) 0.66 0.65 0.65 65%
article modification (m = 10) 0.73 0.47 0.63 65%
Table 1: Detection results on the attacks of Section 4. Zero-shot defense performance (not included) is very
low in all cases. We report (macro) F1 score and overall accuracy. Precision, and recall of the “fake” class are
reported as well.
were labeled false. For this experiment, cases where the generated answer is true are used as real texts and the
ones with false answers as fake texts.
(2) Guided Factual Modifications
In this experiment, the attacker uses a human-written news article and performs subtle modifications to
semantically modify statements. This way, the fake, untruthful, article remains distributionally similar to
human-written real ones. In this attack, we perform the modifications by removing and adding negations
from statements. To remove negations, we randomly delete “not” or “no” occurrences from the text. Then,
we look for other statements to add negations. When negations are added to syntactically-correct location,
the new sentence is a negative inversion of the original (Rudanko, 1982). In order to find these locations
automatically, we use the probabilities of a GPT-2 language model. Specifically, we randomly sample 100
locations in the article and choose the ones with the maximal score, defined as the probability for either “not”
or “no”, multiplied by the probability for the word following the negation.
To create the dataset for this experiment we use articles from The New York Times.7 Original articles are
labeled as real text and articles to which we invert m statements (m2 by removing negations and
m
2 by adding
negations) are labeled as fake text.8
4.1 Results
For both of these attacks, we use a subset of the data for evaluation and the rest for fine-tuning the detector.
The results are shown in Table 1. In question answering, the adapted classifier reached 71% in distinguishing
true vs. false answers generated by Grover, exceeding a trivial majority baseline (51% on our evaluation set).
This suggests that artificially produced “lies” manifest to some extent within the text’s language distributional
features. This was found true for human-written text as well (Rashkin et al., 2017). In our case, even the
length of the answer is indicative: answers labeled as false contained 12.4 words on average compared to true
answers, which had only 9.7. This might be due to our requirement for strictly-true text in the “real” class:
longer sentences are more likely to include at least one false statement. When evaluated only on the short false
answers (up to 10 words), Grover’s accuracy is only 62%. Ultimately, however, despite its nontrivial ability to
differentiate truth from lie, Grover’s performance in this setting is much worse than in distinguishing human
from machine text (see Section 5).
For the automatic article modification attack, Grover fails completely to detect two modifications (m = 2).
Even when we invert up to 10 statements in an article, Grover’s performance is still deficient. As we explain
in Section 1, this is likely due to the similarity in Grover’s feature space between texts of the same origin
(where only slight — but possibly semantically significant — modifications were introduced). Even though
the changes include negations in machine-originated locations and might introduce surprising factual claims,
the distributional difference is subtle enough to cause the fine-tuned classifier to underperform.
5 Baselines: Distributional Features for Provenance-based Defenses
One might suspect that the low performance in Section 4 is due to limited capacity of Grover’s detector.
However, in this section we show that the detector succeeds in similar settings in which the classes are
split by the generation source. Beyond distinguishing full texts sampled from a language model vs. human
7From All the news dataset: https://www.kaggle.com/snapcrack/all-the-news
8This attacker intentionally avoids changing the overall number of negations in corrupted articles, since the number of
negations can be used as a fake-ness indicator.
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Telling human from machine precision recall F1 accuracy
zero-shot
full article 0.84 0.98 0.90 90%
article extension (g = 20%) 0.52 0.20 0.45 51%
article extension (g = 1%) 0.07 0.01 0.28 37%
adaptive
full article 0.93 0.94 0.94 94%
article extension (g = 20%) 0.90 0.97 0.95 95%
article extension (g = 1%) 0.91 0.95 0.94 95%
QA (machine vs. human) 0.82 0.86 0.83 83%
Table 2: Detection results on the attacks of Section 5 in a zero-shot setting and the adaptive setting (where the
discriminator is fine-tuned to a specific attacker). We report (macro) F1 score and overall accuracy. Precision,
and recall of the “fake” class are reported as well.
ones (Zellers et al., 2019), we also experiment with more sophisticated attackers that automatically extend
articles.
(1) Fully-generated Articles
First, unlike Zellers et al. (2019), we evaluate Grover against texts generated by a different model of similar
size. For this out of domain attack, we use an unconditioned GPT-2 XL model (Radford et al., 2019). The
dataset contains:
Real text: Examples from the WebText test set.9
Fake text: Generations from the released outputs of the GPT-2 XL model.
(2) Automatic Article Extension
In order to experiment with mixed human-machine articles, we build an attacker that automatically extends
unfinished human-written articles. We simulate this attacker by querying a GPT-2 medium model, conditioned
on the the first 500 words from an article.10
Real text: Articles from The New York Times.
Fake text: Articles that were automatically extended. We keep only the first few generated sentences in order
to explore the defense against different percentages (g) of machine-generated text. The examples of the first
attack were also included in order to preserve the ability to classify full articles.
(3) Automatic Question Answering (provenance detection)
In this experiment, we test whether the QA defense from Section 4 can perform better when it knows that true
texts are always human-written. To this end, we repeat the same setting but use the gold answers from the
newsQA dataset for the real text class.
5.1 Results
Zero-shot Setting As Table 2 depicts, the zero-shot classifier is effective in detecting the fully generated
articles of a different model, with a 0.9 macro-F1 score.
The extended articles, which contain a substantial amount of human-written text, are mostly classified as
human-written in this setting. This is unsurprising considering the dataset of full articles that it was trained on.
Adaptive Setting After fine-tuning on relevant examples, Grover improves the full article score and also
performs well against article extension generations, reaching 0.94 macro-F1 for articles with a single generated
sentence (g = 1%). This demonstrates that when we can assume a text generator is only used by an attacker,
having access to attacker-produced training examples enables a fine-tuned Grover to detect that source.
Although the question-answering setting is similar to article extension (g = 1%) by containing a single
machine-generated sentence, the adapted detector’s score is 0.09 points lower. This drop in performance can
be explained by using the (stronger) Grover-Mega model for the QA setting, compared to GPT-2 medium
for article extension. Also, the appended template was chosen by empirically selecting the one that makes
9https://github.com/openai/gpt-2-output-dataset
10To use GPT2 for automatic generations online: https://transformer.huggingface.co
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the generated answers look most reasonable for a human reader. Still, the score of the provenance-based QA
defense is 0.12 points higher than the veracity-based QA. Therefore, in order to achieve high scores with this
distributional-based defense, we need to assume that text generators are used only to create fake cases.
Overall, we conclude that this defense is highly effective when the sources of fake text and real text are
different.
6 Conclusion
Previous studies on automatic fake news detection mainly fall into two categories. In the first, more common
type, detection is based on the provenance of the article. In the second approach, detectors analyze the content
and verify it against reliable sources.
Recently, improvements to automatic text generators were shown to enable the creation of realistic-looking
news articles that are based on made-up facts. While a human reader might confuse these articles with real
ones, their distributional features are sufficiently different for a provenance-based defense to detect them.
However, this approach does not account for the scenario where generators are also used for producing
legitimate text, and nor for more sophisticated attackers that use the generator to create malicious content
while keeping minimal distributional differences from a legitimate source.
We demonstrate the first setting by considering auto-completion of news articles with correct information. For
demonstrating the second setting, we consider an attacker that uses the probabilities assigned by a language
model to guide minimal edits that modify the correctness of an article’s statements. Thus, defenses that
perform detection of auto-generated text extremely well can still be fooled by generator-based attackers.
To inform the development of better detectors against all types of fake news, it is important to build diverse and
challenging datasets. We recommend to extend our datasets and create a benchmark that represents content’s
veracity in a wide range of human-machine collaborating applications, from whole article generation to hybrid
writing and editing. This reflects a definition of fake news that incorporates veracity rather than provenance.
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